

IMMANUEL KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON EXISTENCE

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Abstract

The article attempts to highlight the main aspects of I. Kant's theory of knowledge, in which, in contrast to pre-Kantian philosophy, a new concept of a subject capable of cognitive activity has been put forward. Kant's provisions on the nature of the individual's active existence, the essence of the process of cognition as a synthesis of sensuality and reason, and the doctrine of antinomy are comprehended. The concept of a "transcendental subject", the essence of Kant's "criticism" as a method of cognition, experience as the main means of cognition are considered.

Keywords: theory of knowledge, consciousness, knowledge, mind, transcendental, reason, substance, a priori, a posteriori.

Introduction

The philosophical heritage of Immanuel Kant in the theory of knowledge has lasting significance in the modern understanding of the cognitive abilities of man as a subject of social existence. This aspect in the history of philosophy belongs to a little-studied scientific area. Meanwhile, understanding the nature of the active existence of modern man from the position of the "Kantian imperative" has important theoretical and practical significance.

Kant I. developed three most important methodological problems. The first problem concerns the proof of the possibility of theoretical knowledge. By analyzing the conditions and forms of sensory and rational knowledge, he shows the universality and necessity of scientific knowledge. The second problem is to show the illegitimateness of reason's claim to supersensible knowledge. The third problem is to justify the premises for the practical application of reason, i.e. conditions of possibility of a "metaphysics of morality," or principles governing subjective behavior.

Kant's discovery of fundamentally new theoretical possibilities for the development of philosophical knowledge is associated, first of all, with the development of categorical structures of the theory of knowledge. The essence of the revolution he accomplished in philosophy is to evaluate knowledge as an activity, and it (the activity) proceeds according to its own laws.

Kant believed that all human knowledge begins with experience, although it does not flow entirely from it. Therefore, he believed that a person cannot fully understand the world and that in every object there is something unknowable. Kant called this position "the thing in itself."

In one of his main works - "Critique of Pure Reason" - I. Kant, for the first time in science, provides a justification for the universality of scientific knowledge, which became the basis of the theory of knowledge. It is not the character and structure of the cognizable substance, he



believes, that should be considered as the determining factor in the method of cognition, but the specificity of the cognizing subject constructing the object of knowledge. Different people have different knowledge, different assessments of the same phenomena. Hence the conclusion about the impossibility of generally valid knowledge of the essence of the nature of things. Recognizing the existence of things outside our consciousness, Kant declares them unknowable. The nature of things, as they exist in themselves, writes Kant, is fundamentally inaccessible to our knowledge. It is believed that only the “world of phenomena” is cognizable, and it is the way through which things are revealed to our knowledge. Hence the classic position that the subject of philosophy should not be the study of things - nature, the world, man - but the study of cognitive activity, the establishment of laws and the boundaries of the human mind. Based on this premise and calling his philosophy “transcendental,” Kant puts in the foreground not the method of experimental knowledge of an object, but the method of its a priori knowledge. Comprehensible being lies beyond the boundaries of experimental knowledge and therefore is not reflected in logical definitions. The objectivity of knowledge is determined by the structure of the transcendental subject, and it (the structure) lies in the plane of the supra-individual principle in man. The structure of the Kantian subject is therefore the basis of objective knowledge.

In developing this thought of Kant, it is appropriate to cite K. Jaspers’ understanding of the transcendental nature of the subject’s existence. “If a person is no longer cognized as the being that he is,” writes Jaspers, “he, in cognizing, brings himself into a state of instability of absolute possibility. In it he hears a call to his freedom, from which he only through himself becomes what he can be, but does not yet exist... Knowledge is in the hand of the person who grasps it. However, for himself he is something completely incomplete and not allowing for completion, transferred to no one else. Thoughts only light his way” [1]. Kant solves similar thoughts about the ontology of knowledge, about how knowledge occurs in the future, from the position of criticizing the cognitive abilities of the subject, and this makes it possible to identify their nature and capabilities.

Kant emphasizes that “criticism” contains a positive role, since it provides the mind with prospects for the necessary moral application, allows it to “think freedom” and set the highest goal for the will and reason, which is to “expand the boundaries of the sensible to the sphere of the supersensible” [2] . And “as freedom, he conjures being as its hidden transcendence” [3]. In accordance with this, philosophy, or “the legislation of human reason,” according to Kant, has two subjects - nature and freedom, and contains a natural moral law.

In this regard, Kant also posed the problem of the character and ability of the knowing subject, the achievement of agreement between the object of knowledge and knowledge about the object of knowledge. From this formulation of the problem it follows that the activity of the subject acts as a basis, and the subject of research as a consequence. Consequently, he saw the basis of scientific knowledge in the activity of the subject of knowledge in constructing the essence of an object. It should be emphasized that in the theory of knowledge, Kant idealizes sensibility and reason, which, in his opinion, constitute two different trunks in human knowledge, and concludes that scientific knowledge can only be thought of as a synthesis of



sensibility and reason. This situation led to the solution of another problem: how this synthesis is carried out and how to justify the universality of knowledge as a product of such a synthesis. Solving this problem, Kant argues that individual perception becomes generally valid thanks to the understanding with the help of categories that constitute ready-made constructions in the human intellect and provide a priori forms of thinking. Kant defines reason as spontaneous activity, therefore the activity of reason is formal and requires some content. The mind feeds on sensuality with such content. With the help of a priori forms of contemplation, reason performs the function of subsuming the diversity of sensory perception under the unity of the concept. In this case, the role of categories is very significant. But these categories, as the essence of human intelligence, represent only the possibility of knowledge, and not knowledge itself. Knowledge is provided by the combination of sensory knowledge received from the outside with the categories present in the human intellect, which allow one to generalize sensory data [4]. There is knowledge a priori, this is a special kind of knowledge that goes beyond the sensory world, where there can be no means of verification [5]. The fact that the understanding itself constructs an object in accordance with a priori forms of thinking, "i.e. categories," according to Kant, removes the question of why objects are consistent with our knowledge of them. He emphasized that we should not confuse what a thing is to us and what it represents in itself. And no matter how much we penetrate into the depths of phenomena, our knowledge will still differ from things as they are in themselves. We do not know and cannot know what objects actually are: we cannot compare what is in consciousness with what lies beyond it, transcendental to it [6]. As a result, Kant's conclusion can be expressed as a formula for the theory of knowledge as follows: "We can only know what we ourselves have created." And this means that the activity of the subject is placed at the forefront, a transition is made from substance to subject, from being to activity. The place of the substance of the former rationalism is now occupied by the transcendental subject.

At the same time, having rejected the substantialism of pre-Kantian philosophy, Kant poses another question: what serves as the basis for unity, with the help of which reason carries out its function of unifying the diverse. Kant finds such a higher unity in the subject, which is seen in an always identical act: the act of self-consciousness, expressed in the formula: "I think." Kant calls this act the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and considers it the source of all unity. And at the same time, Kant does not consider reason to be the highest cognitive ability: it lacks a driving stimulus - a goal that would give direction to its activity. Kant believes that the activity of the understanding can be guided by reason, setting goals for it.

One of the most important aspects of Kant's theory of knowledge is the "transcendental deduction of the category," dedicated to clarifying the question of how the subjective conditions of thinking can acquire objective meaning. Kant writes that outside our knowledge there is nothing that we could oppose to knowledge as corresponding to it. Our knowledge can deal with the world of objects, and this world is spatiotemporal. But since space and time are not forms of the objective existence of things in themselves and since they have no meaning outside the organization of our consciousness, Kant concludes that all possible knowledge about nature is not knowledge of "things in themselves." Nature as an object of knowledge is not an unconnected chaos of impressions. It reveals patterns everywhere, revealing universal



and necessary connections between phenomena. Reason, Kant argues, gives rise to nature as an object of knowledge only in the sense that without the forms of reason, knowledge would not be knowledge of the universal laws of nature. “Without sensuality, not a single object would be given to us, and not a single object could be thought on the basis of reason. Thoughts without content are empty, contents without concepts are blind. These two abilities cannot perform the functions of each other. The understanding cannot contemplate anything, and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their combination can knowledge arise” [7]. As you can see, knowledge is a synthesis of sensuality and reason.

Next, I. Kant develops the problem of the principles of synthesis as a meaningful process, as a way of applying reason to phenomena, to empirical intuitions. Solving this problem, Kant again turns to the moments of sensory cognition and raises the question of the unity of sensibility and reason as “heterogeneous” moments of cognition. The difficulty in solving this problem lies in the fact that the categories of reason are completely heterogeneous with sensory intuitions and therefore cannot be logically subsumed under each other. To be able to synthesize them, it is necessary to find a “connecting” link. This third link in Kant is time as a formal condition of all phenomena in general.

“Transcendental Analytics” establishes the epistemological conditions for the possibility of experience and scientific knowledge. These studies outline Kant's concept of truth and reason. But besides reason, among the functions that claim theoretical knowledge, there is one more - reason. Kant placed reason at the center of his philosophical system, hence the name of his main works. With the help of reason, Kant asserts, our consciousness realizes the inherent desire for the unconditional unity of all our knowledge. Kant believes that dialectical reason completes our knowledge, bringing the material of intuition under the “highest unity of thought” and giving the empirical actions of the understanding a systematic form. Ideas of reason serve as regulatory principles for the use of reason, guiding it “better and further” than empirical knowledge [8]. At the same time, Kant's analysis of the ideas of reason pursues the goal of strengthening the edifice of morality and justifying the transition from natural concepts to practical ones.

“Pure reason” sets itself the task of achieving absolute integrity in the application of the concepts of reason and strives to bring the synthetic unity, conceivable in categories, to the absolutely unconditional. Kant calls “transcendental ideas” concepts of reason for which the senses cannot provide an adequate object. According to Kant, there are only three such ideas: 1) psychological, or the idea of the soul as the unconditional unity of all mental phenomena and processes, 2) cosmological, or the idea of the world as the unconditional unity of all conditions of phenomena, and 3) theological, or the idea of God as the unconditional cause of everything that exists and is conceivable in general.

Kant builds the foundation of dialectical reason on the basis that experience is a product of the interaction of object and subject, the unity of substantive and formal aspects. Dialectical reason is introduced into the structure of the abilities of the transcendental subject as a result of reflection of relative experience. Kant believed that a person does not have a means of establishing a connection, comparing “things in themselves” and phenomena. This led to the conclusion about the limited possibilities for cognition of the forms of sensuality and reason.



Based on this, Kant in his theory recognized the correctness of empiricism and argued that all our knowledge of time begins with experience.

Only the world of experience is accessible to the forms of sensuality and reason, he writes. Everything that is beyond experience is the intelligible world, and it can only be accessible to reason. Reason constitutes the highest ability of the subject, guides the activity of the intellect, and sets goals for it. The mind operates with ideas. According to Kant, ideas are not supersensible entities, as Plato argued, they do not have real existence, comprehended with the help of reason. Ideas of reason, Kant writes, are thoughts about a goal, and our knowledge strives towards this, as well as about the tasks that they set for themselves. Ideas, as representations of a goal, regulate cognitive function, stimulating the mind to activity. Reason, which is prompted by reason, strives for knowledge and goes beyond experience. However, its components in the form of concepts and categories function only within these limits. As a result, reason is lost in contradictions.

With his teaching on the antinomies of reason, Kant proves the proposition that a real object cannot correspond to the ideas of reason, and that reason relies on imaginary ideas. Antinomy means a contradiction in the law, the appearance in the course of reasoning of two contradictory, but equally valid judgments [9]. Kant believes that reason cannot go beyond sensory experience and know “things in themselves.” According to Kant, attempts of this kind lead the mind to contradictions, since they make it possible to justify both the affirmation and the denial of each of the antinomies. For example: it is stated that every complex substance consists of simple parts, at the same time, nothing simple exists; or – there is freedom in the world – there is no freedom in the world; there is a first cause of the world - there is no first cause of the world. Or, it turns out that it is possible to prove the validity of two contradictory statements: the world is finite, and the world is infinite in space and time. Antinomies occur where, with the help of finite human reason, they try to draw conclusions not about the world of experience, but about the world of “things in themselves.”

So, the world of “things in themselves” is closed to sensibility, and, therefore, it is closed to theoretical reason and science. However, this does not mean that this world is inaccessible to man. Man, according to Kant, is an inhabitant of two worlds: the sensually perceived and the intelligible. The sensory-perceptual world is the natural world. The intelligible world is a world of freedom. Freedom, according to Kant, means independence from the determining causes of the sensory-perceptible world. In the sphere of freedom, it is not theoretical, but practical reason that operates. This reason is called practical because its main purpose is to guide a person’s actions. The driving force of this mind is not thinking, but will. Kant calls the human will autonomous. The autonomy of the will is determined not by external reasons, but by its own law, which it places above itself. The laws of practical reason are moral laws. Their main demand: “Act in such a way that the maximum of your will can at the same time have the force of the principle of universal legislation.”

But at the same time, he agrees with rationalism, emphasizing that not all of our knowledge is deducible from experience. He called knowledge arising from experience “a posteriori,” and knowledge that does not depend on experience “a priori.” At the same time, Kant believed that a priori are forms acquired by a person in the course of familiarization with the forms that



developed before him, while the material from experience was always a posteriori. All knowledge must consist of both form and material [11]. Reason, in its sources, turns out to be a truly dialectical ability: the source of its ideas is the very contradictory nature of empirical knowledge, where there is no unconditional unity and completeness. From here follows the “theoretical” dissatisfaction of the mind. Based on this, Kant emphasizes that the source of illusions and misconceptions is not dialectical reason itself, but only the abuse of its ideas. Ideas must serve to continue and expand experience as much as possible, and no limit can be considered absolute. They perform the function of regulating maximum heuristic principles of cognition and contribute to the promotion of “empirical synthesis” [12]. As follows from this position, in “transcendental dialectics” the concept of the boundaries of theoretical knowledge and the sphere of experience, in a certain sense, lose their absolute meaning and acquire a more mobile, flexible character, pointing to the inevitable limitations of any specific subject knowledge as the result of finite cognitive activity.

In Kant's theory of knowledge, the doctrine of principles occupies an important place. In this regard, he touches on issues of analytics, aesthetics, space and time, etc. Studies of the logical structure of judgments in mathematics and natural science led Kant to the idea that in all judgments that expand knowledge, the connection between the predicate and the subject is not analytical, but synthetic.

Natural science, according to Kant, entered the high road of science much later. Kahn's statement can serve as a general methodology for the sciences: “... physics owes such a favorable revolution in its way of thinking solely to a (lucky) guess - in accordance with what the mind itself puts into nature, to look for (and not invent) in it what what he must learn from her and what he would not know on his own” [13] Kant calls metaphysics knowledge through only concepts, and the mind finds itself constantly in a state of stagnation, although it is older than all sciences and has not yet entered the right path.

Speaking about transcendental analytics, Kant argues that natural science has fundamental principles that cannot be generalizations from experience and represent a priori judgments in their logical form. These are, for example, the provisions on the stability of a substance (the law of conservation of substances). The laws underlying all natural science cannot be derived from experience; they are the a priori principles of “pure” reason. The content of knowledge is not created by our consciousness and is the result of the influence of things, Kant notes and continues that consciousness is passive in relation to content, and active in relation to its form. In this regard, the problem of the category is raised. According to Kant, categories constitute the basic concepts of the understanding, forming the a priori form of the conceivability of any objects, their properties and relationships. Kant tries to find a source from which a complete system of categories in formal logic can be derived. Defining a category as a synthesis that combines the data of sensibility with the activity of the mind, he names the categories of quantity, quality, relationship, modelability, etc.

Kant defines transcendental aesthetics as the science of all a priori principles of sensibility. “So,” writes Kant, “in transcendental aesthetics, we first of all isolate sensibility, abstracting everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing remains except empirical intuition.” Kant defines the pure forms of such sensory intuition as a priori



knowledge as time and space. Kant's teaching about space and time differs from his previous ideas. The researcher says that space and time should be considered as a priori forms of sensibility that do not determine knowledge of the actual nature of things. Kant emphasizes that the “transcendental” ideality of space and time that he affirms supposedly leaves their empirical reality completely intact: for experience, all things are in space, and all events take place in time. The valuable conclusion is that space and time themselves are ideal in the “transcendental” sense, i.e. are not valid outside human consciousness and cannot be definitions of things.

Kant's doctrine of dialectical reason contains undoubted new approaches to understanding the specifics of any scientific theory as a logical method of cognitive activity. At the same time, such an understanding of the essence of theoretical knowledge is closely related to the question of the concreteness of truth, the epistemological problem of the relationship between relative and absolute truth and the possibility of developing knowledge by posing and solving new problems. It is this problematic that constitutes the real content of Kant's understanding of the regulative meaning of the ideas of reason.

In general, the logic of Kant's judgments in the structure of the theory of knowledge can be expressed as follows: the existence of an object is realized by itself, acting on the human senses, giving rise to diverse sensations. Sensations are systematized by pre-experimental forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time, recording their duration. On this basis, a perception is formed, which is subjective and individual in nature. The activity of the mind on the basis of concepts and categories, as a form of thinking, gives these perceptions a universal and necessary character. Through the forms of sensuality and reason, the object itself becomes the property of consciousness, and it can make certain conclusions about it. Kant called things, as they exist in the consciousness of the subject, phenomena. Man, according to Kant, can only know phenomena. What things are in themselves, i.e. What are their qualities and properties, their relationships outside the subject's consciousness, man does not know and cannot know. He knows about a thing only in the form in which it is given to his consciousness. Therefore, a thing in itself for a person becomes a “thing in itself”: unknown, undisclosed.

Kant adds the transcendental doctrine of method to his studies of transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic. By it Kant means “the determination of the formal conditions for the complete system of pure reason” [14]. The study of these conditions gives transcendental philosophy the doctrine of “pure reason” and its canon, i.e. about the set of a priori principles, the correct use of cognitive abilities in general, about their architectonics, i.e. about the art of constructing a system, and finally about its history, for which Kant indicates only a place that remains in the system and which must still be filled in the future. At the same time, Kant does not deny that his teaching is idealism, he emphasizes that his idealism is an idealism of a special kind, and that it refutes the idealism of previous philosophy. According to Kant's definition, it is unprecedented in the history of philosophy. Calling this type of idealism transcendental, Kant contrasts it with dogmatic idealism, which is unable to solve the problem of the criterion of truth and proves that the transition from a priori knowledge occurs not to sensory, but to a completely different intellectual intuition. At the same time, he noted that an intuitively thinking mind is generally possible; such could be, for example, the mind of a higher being,



compared to man. However, the ability for intellectual intuition is completely alien to man, since regardless of sensuality we cannot have any intuition; therefore, understanding is not the faculty of intuition.

According to supporters of Kant's philosophy, he did not simply change the places of the subject and object of knowledge, thereby forcing objective reality to revolve around the subject, but transformed the concept of the object of knowledge, replacing it with the concept and problem of the conditions of knowledge in which only the achievement of objectivity is possible. Only under certain conditions, i.e. in the forms of space and time, quantity and quality, relationships and modalities inherent in knowledge itself, what is called "objectivity," the object of knowledge, can be realized.

Neo-Kantian philosophy of science represented an important milestone: it closed an entire era of the development of European thought, which was oriented primarily towards scientific knowledge. The emergence of neo-Kantianism coincided with a turning point in science itself, namely the creation of non-Euclidean geometry, the creation of the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Just as these discoveries changed the fundamental concepts of the exact sciences and posed a number of methodological problems for scientists, neo-Kantianism came up with a demand to rethink the very concept of knowledge and its logical structure.

In conclusion, it should be noted that while developing the theory of knowledge, I. Kant repeatedly emphasized the one-sidedness and inconsistency of the previous philosophy, while he saw the reasons for its main shortcomings precisely in the methodology, which led either to dogmatism or skepticism. In contrast to the methods of traditional philosophy, he introduced into scientific circulation the concept of a critical method, with which, according to V.A. Zhuchkov, he associated the beginning of a new stage in philosophy [15]. To the main question of criticism: how is philosophy possible, Kant comes to the conclusion that philosophy is impossible as dogmatic, i.e. not preceded by a theory of knowledge, a science of objective activity that claims theoretical knowledge of "things in themselves," thereby philosophy is deprived of the theoretical meaning that pre-Kantian rationalism prescribed for it.

At the core of Kant's work during the "critical period" is the conviction that the development of theoretical philosophy, morality, aesthetics and natural philosophy must be preceded by a critical examination of the cognitive abilities on which these branches of philosophy rely. As follows from the above material, by "criticism" Kant understands, firstly, the exact clarification of cognitive abilities, or mental strength, to which each branch of knowledge and philosophy refers. Secondly, by "criticism" Kant means the study of boundaries beyond which the competence of theoretical and practical reason cannot extend due to the structure of consciousness itself. Believing that the main means of understanding the world is experience, he admitted that not everything can be studied through experience. Therefore, in Kant's scientific constructions there was no place for the "supernatural," he believed that it could not be proven experimentally. But he came to the conviction that the whole world can be the subject of theoretical knowledge, thereby emphasizing the cognitive abilities of man - the "cognitive subject."



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