BETWEEN GREAT POWERS: UZBEKISTAN’S MULTI-VECTOR FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AFTER 2016

Abstract

Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has shifted dramatically since 2016, from semi isolation to active engagement with Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union. Yet scholars disagree whether this constitutes mere pragmatic balancing or a deliberate strategic hedging strategy aimed at preserving decision making autonomy. Drawing on strategic hedging and structural power theories through qualitative analysis of peer reviewed articles, official documents, and policy reports, this paper identifies four concrete hedging mechanisms: the C5+1 format as a dovetailing tool, economic diversification (EU’s EPCA, US’s MSP, China’s $5 bn deals), selective institutional engagement (EAEU observer status), and regional leadership (threefold increase in intra-regional trade to $7 bn). The findings reveal a fundamental paradox – hedging simultaneously enhances autonomy and creates new dependencies: 70% of critical minerals exports go to China, and remittances from Russia account for 15–20% of GDP. Uzbekistan operates in a multipolar competition zone, which enables what the study terms “structural mobility” – the ability to move between competing structural systems. The paper concludes that for middle powers, complete autonomy is unattainable; successful hedging diversifies dependencies rather than eliminating them.